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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court intervened recently in a whaling
policy conflict between the legislative and executive branches. The Court
cast its deciding vote in favor of the compromise approach adopted by the
Secretary of Commerce (the Secretary) rather than the strict conservationist position endorsed by Congress. The specific issue in the dispute
was whether conservation statutes prohibited the Secretary from substituting statutory sanctions designed to encourage whale conservation for
promises of future adherence to international whale conservation efforts.
Characterizing the dispute as a question of statutory interpretation, the
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Court ultimately endorsed the Secretary's interpretation of his duties as
discretionary with respect to the whaling statutes. The issue, however,
was much more complex than the Court's characterization suggested because the decision would affect both United States whale policy and international whale conservation efforts which both stood at crucial points
at the time of the decision.
The initial and present goals of the International Whaling Commission (IWC) are in conflict. Established to conserve the whaling industry,
the IWC has shifted its orientation toward whale protection.' This shift
occurred because of the efforts of conservationist nations such as the
United States. Although ecologically beneficial, the shift threatens to destroy the internal structure of the IWC.
United States whale policy has developed from equally contradictory
bases. Its position as a leader of conservation efforts is offset by its tradition in whaling, its continued support for aboriginal whaling, and its
hollow threats of sanctions against nations that fail to protect whales.
Given this contradiction, the United States has struggled to apply existing legal sanctions. Congress seems to take an uncompromising position on sanction enforcement while the President favors a more moderate
conciliatory approach.
The case presented to the Supreme Court required, therefore, more
than statutory interpretation. The parties asked the Court to decide
which approach to follow,2 in effect inviting the Court to make foreign
policy. Furthermore, the dispute involved an executive agreement that
contradicted prior federal law. The issue of whether an executive agreement overrides prior, inconsistent federal law is unsettled in this case.
More importantly, because the dispute involves separation of powers issues and requires a foreign policy determination, judicial review may
have been inappropriate.

1. See generally P.

BIRNIE, INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF WHALING: FROM

CONSERVATION OF WHALING TO CONSERVATION OF WHALES AND REGULATION OF
WHALE-WATCHING

(1985).

2. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., U.S.
, 106 S.Ct.
2860, 2872 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting). Marshall argued that the Court's decision
gave the Secretary the power to act contrary to a clear congressional directive. Id.
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II.

INTERNATIONAL WHALING REGULATION

A. Whaling Regulation Prior to the International Conventionfor the
Regulation of Whaling
In the early part of this century, observers noted the need for whaling
regulations to remedy the marked decrease in whale catches and stocks'
caused by technological advances and distorted whaling economics." Specifically, improved technology facilitated whaling without accounting for
the diminishing number of available whales.' The economic consequences of unrestricted whaling prompted whalers to overinvest in
equipment while ignoring both the lack of increased demand for whale
products and any possible long-term effects on the whale supply.' Whalers based this short-term thinking in part on the traditional notion of
infinite marine resources.7 The whale's demise disposed of that notion.'
Recognizing the need for some sort of international whaling regulation, twenty-six nations9 signed the Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling in 1931 (1931 Convention).' 0 Specifically, the 1931 Convention
protected calves and suckling whales, prohibited the killing of right

3. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 105-09; Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, The Law
and the Whale: Current Development in the International Whaling Controversy, 8
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 149, 149-50 (1976). League of Nations observers stated that

the League would provide the best means for handling whaling regulation.
4. Note, Enforcement Questions of the InternationalWhaling Commission: Are Exclusive Economic Zones the Solution?, 14 CAL. W. INT'L L. J. 114, 121 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Enforcement Questions].
5. Technological advancements such as the shell harpoon, which provided greater
harpoon accuracy, and the floating factory ship, which allowed whalers to process their
harvest at sea, increased the whaling industry's efficiency. Note, The Conservation of
Whales, 5 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 99, 100 (1972) [hereinafter Note, The Conservation of
Whales]. The advent of sonar along with the use of helicopters for tracking would further help whalers hunt whales. See id.
6. Keen, The 200-Mile Zone in U.S. Ocean Policy, in THE WHALING ISSUE IN U.S.
- JAPAN RELATIONS 164, 178-79 (J. Schmidhauser & G. Totten, eds. 1978) [hereinafter
THE WHALING ISSUE]. Whalers harvested whales primarily for their oil. Whaling practice stifled the reproduction of whale stocks because females contain the most oil. See
Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 99.
7. See Freidheim, Constructing a Theory of the 200-Mile Economic Zone, in THE
WHALING ISSUE, supra note 6, at 152-54.
8. Id. at 154-55.
9. Perhaps more notable than the signatories were those whaling nations which did
not sign: Japan, Chile, Argentina, and the USSR. See Note, The Conservation of
Whales, supra note 5, at 103.
10. Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signatureSept. 24, 1931,
49 Stat. 3079, T.I.A.S. No. 880, 155 L.N.T.S. 3586 [hereinafter 1931 Convention].
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whales, required the licensing of whaling vessels, covered all oceans, and
placed enforcement responsibilities in the hands of each nation.11 However, the 1931 Convention applied only to baleen whales, leaving toothed
whales unprotected. 2 The motive of many nations complying with the
regulations was not to protect whales, but to prevent overproduction of
whale oil."3 Generally, the 1931 Convention failed to provide effective
whale conservation because of its narrow scope, limited acceptance, and
lax enforcement. 4 Since 1930, commentators had been expressing the
need for more effective and scientifically-based restrictions.1" The Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling (1937 Agreement) followed." The
1937 Agreement covered more whale species, outlawed the killing of
gray and right whales, established minimum catch lengths for each regulated species, defined catch seasons, delineated geographical boundaries
for factory ships, and required each nation to compile and communicate
statistical data of each hunt. 17 Despite these changes, the 1937 Agreement made few substantive alterations in international whaling
regulation.1
The conservation efforts of the 1937 Agreement suffered from many of
the same flaws as the 1931 Convention. Lack of acceptance, 9 lax en-

11.

Id., arts. 1, 4, 5, 8 & 9.

12. Id., art. 2. Baleen whales have no teeth, but have a special bone over which they
sift their food. Common varieties of toothless whales are gray, sei, humpback, finback,
right, and blue. The other general type of whales has teeth. Beaked, sperm, and killer
whales as well as dolphins and porpoises represent this category. Coggins, Legal Protec-

tion for Marine Mammals: An Overview of Innovative Resource Conservation Legislation, 6 ENVTL. L. 1, 3 (1975).
13. Omura, Origin of the International Whaling Commission, in THE WHALING
ISSUE, supra note 6, at 28-29.
14. Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 103. The 1931 Convention
suffered also from a lack of effective enforcement provisions and imprecise definitions of
harvest seasons, whale ages, and activities constituting violations. Id. at 102-03.
15. Jessup, Editorial Comment, The InternationalProtection of Whales, 24 AM. J.
INT'L L. 751, 752 (1930) (suggested that future measures include international conventions, national legislation, and scientific studies).
16. Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature May 7, 1937,
52 Stat. 1460, T.I.A.S. No. 933, 190 L.N.T.S. 4406 [hereinafter 1937 Agreement].
17. Compare id., arts. 4, 5, 7, 9 & 13-17 with 1931 Convention, supra note 10, arts.
1, 4, 5, 7 & 9 (to show what changed and what remained). See generally Note, The
Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 102-05 (discusses both early attempts at whaling regulation).
18. Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 105.
19. Only nine nations originally signed the 1937 Agreement. Japan, Chile, and the
USSR did not. Japan, however, stated that it would abide by the agreement even though
it did not sign it. Japan failed to comply with the 1937 Agreement. See id. at 104.
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forcement,2 ° and rigidity2 undermined its effectiveness. The participating countries again supported whaling regulation to protect the whaling
industry rather than to protect the whale.22 Furthermore, the regulations
were ineffective conservation measures because they reflected accommodation of the interests of whaling nations to gain acceptance rather than
to insure whale protection.2 3 In short, the early regulatory schemes failed
to provide effective whaling conservation. They did -provide, however, a
glimpse of the problems facing future international regulatory measures.
B. Whaling Regulation Under the InternationalConvention for the
Regulation of Whaling
In 1946, fifteen nations signed the International Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling (ICRW).2 The ICRW sought to conserve
whales while protecting whaling nations from "widespread economic and
nutritional distress."'2 5 Specifically, the ICRW placed enforcement responsibilities with each signatory nation, provided objection and withdrawal procedures, and promulgated an original schedule of regulations." This original schedule laid out various restrictions on whaling
techniques and practices, required statistical reports of whale catches,
outlawed the commercial taking of gray and right whales, set minimum
catch lengths, provided an exception for aboriginal whaling, and established a quota of 16,000 blue whale units27 for operations in the

20. The 1937 Agreement incorporated the 1931 Convention's enforcement provisions. The only difference was that the 1937 Agreement required one governmental observer on each factory ship. Compare 1937 Agreement, supra note 16, art. I with 1931
Agreement, supra note 10, art. 1.
21. See Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1376 (9th Cir. 1980) (general discussion of
the historical problems of international whaling regulation). The method for amending
the 1931 Convention and the 1937 Agreement-formal protocol-discouraged change.
Id.
22. See 1937 Agreement, supra note 16, at preamble; Note, Enforcement Questions,
supra note 4, at 122 (both regulatory schemes aimed at protection of the whale oil
industry).
23. Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 105.
24. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, opened for signature
Dec. 2, 1946, 62 Stat. 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S. 72 [hereinafter ICRW].
Among the original signatories were the whaling nations of Chile, Argentina, and the
USSR. Japan ratified the ICRW in 1951. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 216.
25. ICRW, supra note 24, at preamble. In addition, the ICRW was designed "to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly
development of the whaling industry." Id.
26. Id., arts. V, IX, XI & Schedule.
27. Id., Schedule 8(b) defined one blue whale unit as one blue whale, two fin
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Antarctic Ocean.2" The ICRW also established the International Whaling Commission (IWC) and empowered it to amend the ICRW by
adopting conservation regulations.29
Early IWC actions catered to the short-term economic concerns of the
whaling industry rather than to effective conservation."0 This orientation
began to shift in the 1960s when the IWC enacted the first quota reductions in 19631 followed by a ban on blue whale hunting in 1964.32 Between 1972 and 1982, the IWC moved toward conservation by reducing
catch limits by approximately seventy-three percent, limiting the use of
factory ships, creating a sanctuary in the Indian Ocean, and replacing
the blue whale unit with specific catch limits for each species.3 3 The
IWC replaced the blue whale unit with catch limits based on the "maximum sustainable yield," a figure determined by calculating the number
34
of whales that can be taken from each species without endangering it.

whales, two and one half humpback whales, or six sei whales. The blue whale unit was
based on the amount of oil that could be extracted from each species of whale. See Note,
Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 125.
28. See ICRW, supra note 24, Schedule 1112, 8, 9 & 16.
29. Id., arts. III, V. The IWC is composed of one representative of each signatory
nation. Id., art. III, § 1. The IWC's power to adopt regulations includes the power to set
maximum catch limits. Id., art. V, § 1(e). The ICRW requires that any amendments:
(a) shall be such as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources; (b) shall be based on scientific findings;. . . and (d)
shall take into consideration the interests of the consumers of whale products and
the whaling industry ...

Id., art. V, § 2.
The IWC's power to amend the ICRW without formal protocol gave the ICRW the
flexibility the 1931 Convention and the 1937 Agreement lacked. See Hopson, 622 F.2d at
1376.
30. See Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, supra note 3, at 155.
31. Id. at 154.
32. Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 108. The IWC's Scientific
Committee recommended the ban in 1963 after noting the dangerously low number of
blue whales estimated to be alive. Id. at 108. The IWC's own blue whale unit contributed to the blue whale's demise because the blue whale unit encouraged whalers to concentrate their efforts on blue whales. See Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at
125.
33. United States Whaling Policy Oversight, 1983: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Fisheriesand Wildlife Conservation and the Environment of the House Comm. on
Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 247 (1983) (statement of Dr.
John Byrne, Administrator, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce) [hereinafter Hearings I]. See'generally P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at
407-508, 600-34 (summary of each IWC meeting).
34. Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 126. The maximum sustainable
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Several developments prompted the move toward conservation. First,
the complexion of IWC membership changed to predominantly
nonwhaling nations."8 Second, the United States, an advocate of conservation, strongly supported IWC actions."6 Furthermore, economic considerations within the whaling industry made whaling nations more
37
amenable to conservation.
The IWC's shift toward whale conservation culminated in a 1982
moratorium on commercial whaling. 8 This ban went into effect for the
1985-86 pelagic season 9 and the 1986 coastal season. The moratorium
represented a compromise of the more radical measures proposed by the
IWC delegates.40 Furthermore, to both gain acceptance from the whaling
nations and to comport with the purposes of the ICRW the moratorium
contained a delayed commencement provision and a measure for early

yield is based on statistical information regarding overall species population. Id. at 12627. The IWC uses the maximum sustainable yield figure for each species to set the
individual quotas. Id. The blue whale unit, with its focus on whale oil, proved to be a
poor resource management tool because it failed to account for the danger of extinction
possible for each species. Id. at 125.
35. See P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 613. Canada, a whaling nation, withdrew in
1981 and was replaced by eight nonwhaling nations in 1982. By the IWC's 1982 meeting, three-fourths of its members were nonwhaling nations. Id. at 613-14.

36. Note, Hopson v. Kreps: Bowhead Whales, Alaskan Eskimos, and the Political
Question Doctrine, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 231, 243-45 (1981) [hereinafter Note,
Hopson v. Kreps].
37. HearingsI, supra note 33, at 247 (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce).
38. The moratorium measure states:
. . notwithstanding the other provisions of paragraph 10 catch limits for all the
killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal and
1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero. This provision will be kept
under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990, at the latest the
Commission [IWC] will undertake a comprehensive assessment of the effects of
this decision on whale stocks and consider modification of this provision and the
establishment of other catch limits.
Paragraph 10(e), IWC Schedule (Feb. 1983), reprinted in HearingsI, supra note 33, at
247. Because the provision covers only whaling for "commercial purposes," it has no
effect on aboriginal whaling.
Brazil, Iceland, Japan, the People's Republic of Korea, Norway, Peru, and the USSR
voted against the moratorium. Chile, South Africa, the Phillipines, and the People's Republic of China chose not to vote. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 614, n.60.
39. Pelagic whaling refers to whaling operations in which the whale is processed at
sea.
40. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 614-15. Other proposals included a two year phase
out, a ten year moratorium, a permanent ban on commercial whaling, and a permanent
ban on all whaling. Id.
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IWC review."1 Despite these compromises, four nations objected, 42 contending that the moratorium violated the ICRW.43 Ultimately, even if
the moratorium fails, it remains important because the IWC put whale
conservation and protection ahead of the whaling industry's short-term
economic concerns.

4

While the moratorium puts commercial whaling on hold legally, it
also focuses attention on the ICRW's internal problems and on whale
conservation in general. First, the moratorium demonstrates that the
ICRW charged the IWC with conflicting duties. 4' The IWC's duty to
protect whales contravenes its traditional purpose to develop an industry
which has hunted whales to near extinction. Second, the moratorium illustrates how the IWC must dilute conservation measures to gain ultimate approval by member nations.'6 In particular, the IWC delayed the
moratorium and provided for repeal in less than five years. Third, the
ban reveals that the ICRW, like its predecessors, lacks the authority to
implement and enforce its regulations.47 Specifically, the IWC's observer
schemes, designed to aid enforcement, have proved ineffective as most
violations remain unreported. 4' Fourth, whaling may escape restriction.
Whalers may circumvent regulations through the aboriginal exception or
by pirate whaling. 49 Additionally, nations may avoid regulations through

41. Id. at 614.
42. The four objectors were Japan, Norway, Peru and the USSR. Peru, however,
withdrew its objection one year later. Id. at 615, 626.
43. The objectors' main contention was that the ICRW requires any amendments to
have a scientific basis. See id. at 615; see also supra note 29. The Scientific Committee
did not endorse the ban because the committee failed to find the scientific information
necessary to justify the moratorium. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 616. In contrast, the
United Nations Conference on the Human Environment indicated that a moratorium
would have a scientific basis given the whale's role in the world's ecosystem. See United
Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 48/14/Rev. 1, at
12, Recommendation 33 (1972); Nishiwaki, Failureof Past Regulations and the Future
of Whaling, in THE WHALING ISSUE, supra note 6, at 44, 49. Japan charged that the
moratorium was politically motivated rather than scientifically based. P. BIRNIE, supra
note 1, at 616.
44. See Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 110.
45. See Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 123; ICRW, supra note 24,
at preamble; see also supra note 25 and accompanying text.
46. See P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 608.
47. See Note, The Conservation of Whales, supra note 5, at 110-11; see also 1931
Convention, supra note 10, art. I; 1937 Agreement, supra note 24, art. IX; supra notes
14, 19, 21 and accompanying text.
48. Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 127-29.
49. Id. at 129-31.
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the objection or withdrawal provisions of the ICRW.5" Last, new and
old concepts of the law of the sea threaten to undermine IWC authority.
The modern concept of 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs)5 1
and the traditional concept of the sea as common property undermine the
IWC's jurisdiction over all whales.52
These problems suggest that the moratorium threatens to destroy the
ICRW by alienating its member nations. 3 Should the ICRW fail, whaling regulation will be left to each nation and to the market forces of
supply and demand for whale products. Relying on market forces to regulate whaling will in effect sacrifice protection for economic feasibility.
This in turn may mean extinction for various species of whales. 5 Unilateral conservation measures, however, may provide an effective alternative to international schemes.
III. UNITED STATES WHALING POLICY

Despite its tradition as a whaling nation,55 the United States is a
leader in whale conservation efforts. United States policy reflects public
sympathy for the plight of the whale. Graphic documentaries revealing
the whale's plight56 and media campaigns by conservation groups have
57
aroused public emotions.

50. Id. at 115; see ICRW, supra note 24, art. V, § 3(c), & art. XI.
51. The United Nations Third Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) established the 200-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) concept giving each nation authority
over the first 200 miles of their coastal waters. EEZs were designed to protect the fishery
resources of developing nations from exploitation by the developed nations. Third U.N.
Conf. on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 2, Part V, arts. 5558; see also Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 135-36. The IWC's jurisdiction over each nation's EEZ is questioned. See id. at 133-36.
52. Id. at 132-33.
53. See P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 624.
54. See Christol, Schmidhauser & Totten, supra note 2, at 155-56. Among the troubles facing the Japanese whaling industry are the increasing attractiveness of substitutes
to whale products and the financial burden of production capacities far beyond IWC
quotas. Hirasawa, The Whaling Industry in Japan's Economy, in THE WHALING ISSUE, supra note 6, at 82, 86, 95.
55. The United States whaling industry flourished from 1750 to 1850. Nishiwaki,
supra note 43, at 45. The industry's prosperity ended when its main product, oil,
dropped in value and fell prey to a substitute, petroleum. Id. Commercial whaling officially ended in 1970. Coggins, supra note 12, at 4. All that remains of U.S. whaling is
done by Alaskan Eskimos pursuant to permits from the Secretary of Commerce and the
ICRW Schedule's exception for aboriginal whaling. See Hearings I, supra note 33, at
272 (statement of Rep. Breaux).
56. See Coggins, supra note 12, at 14.
57. Totten, Nature of the Whaling Issue in U.S. -JapanRelations, in THE WHAL-
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Although the United States signed each of the three whaling conventions, it did not take a leadership role in whale conservation until the
1970s. Since 1971 the United States has asserted its conservationist policies through the IWC, diplomacy, and domestic legislation. Secretary of
State Alexis Johnson opened the 1971 meeting of the IWC with an attack on both the continued use of the blue whale unit for quotas and the
overall ineffectiveness of the IWC in achieving conservation. 8 One year
later at the 1972 IWC meeting, the United States called for a ten year
moratorium on whaling. Although the IWC rejected this moratorium,
it did discard the blue whale unit."0 Beginning in 1972, the United
States attempted to convince the IWC to implement a moratorium on
commercial whaling.6 1 The IWC finally adopted the United Statesbacked moratorium in 1982.
At home, the United States government attacked whaling economically. In 1971, it outlawed the importation of products made from eight
"endangered" 6 2 species of whales pursuant to the Endangered Species
Act of 1969.63 Consequently, the United States eliminated twenty percent of the world market for those products. 6 Additionally, Congress
passed the Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972 (MMPA) 5 which
banned the importation of products made from marine mammals and
virtually outlawed whaling by United States citizens.6 6
In order to effectuate existing IWC regulations, 67 Congress adopted

supra note 6, at 1, 1-4.
58. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 413.
59. The United States proposal was made in conjunction with the resolution passed
at the 1972 United Nations Convention on the Human Environment which called for a
ten year moratorium on whaling. Id. at 422-23. The moratorium proposal failed, in part
because the IWC's Scientific Committee did not recommend the moratorium because the
ban had no scientific basis. See id. at 430.
60. Id. at 421.
61. HearingsI, supra note 33, at 246 (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator,
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce).
62. Coggins, supra note 12, at 4-5.
63. Endangered Species Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-135, 83 Stat. 275, repealed
Pub. L. No. 93-205, § 13, 87 Stat. 884, 902 (1973). Congress overhauled the act with
the Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 7 and 16 U.S.C.).
64. Coggins, supra note 12, at 4-5.
65. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1361-1407 (1982)) [hereinafter MMPA].
66. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (1982).
67. See Bonker, U.S. Policy and Strategy in the InternationalWhaling Commission:
Sinking or Swimming?, 10 OCEAN DEv. & INT'L L.J. 41, 43 (1981) [hereinafter Bonker
on Policy and Strategy].
ING ISSUE,
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the Pelly Amendment to the Fishermen's Protective Act in 1971 .68 The
Pelly Amendment empowered the President to impose economic sanctions on nations whenever the Secretary of Commerce "certified" to him
that foreign nationals were "directly or indirectly, . . . conducting fishing
operations in a manner or under circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery program. . . ."" The amendment
provided that upon such a finding the President could prohibit the importation of fish products from the offending nation. 0
In 1974 the Secretary of Commerce certified that Japan and the
USSR diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW by taking minke whales
in excess of IWC quotas. The Secretary made the certifications despite
the fact that each country filed a valid ICRW objection to the quota. 1
President Ford, however, chose not to cut off the importation of Japanese and Soviet fish products because both nations agreed to abide by
future IWC regulations.7 2 In 1979, the Secretary of Commerce certified
that Spain took whales in excess of an IWC quota. Spain also filed a
valid objection to the quota. Again, the government withheld sanctions
when Spain agreed to follow future IWC quotas.7
United States negotiators did use the threat of Pelly Amendment certification to coax non-IWC members such as Chile, Peru and the Republic of Korea to join by 1979.7" Through the Pelly Amendment, the
United States helped enforce IWC quotas against both objecting IWC
members and non-IWC members. In addition, the United States established through its practice that continued whaling in excess of IWC quotas diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW and could result in United
States sanctions against violators.
By passing the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fisheries
Conservation and Management Act, 5 Congress further assisted the IWC

68. Pelly Amendment to the Fisherman's Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 92-219, 85
Stat. 786 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982)).

69. Id., § 1978(a)(1), (4).
70. Id., § 1978(a)(4).
71. Preparationsfor the 34th International Whaling Commission Meeting: on
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Human Rights and International Organizationsof
the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-12 (1982) [hereinafter

Preparationsfor the 34th IWC Meetings].
72. Id.
73.
74.
75.
Act of

Id.
Id.
Packwood-Magnuson Amendment to the Fishery Conservation and Management
1976, Pub. L. No. 96-61, § 3(a), 93 Stat. 407 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §

1821 (1982)).
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regulatory efforts. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment, adopted in
1979, refers specifically to the ICRW, expands the list of activities which
may diminish the effectiveness of the conservation program, and mandates sanctions upon certification. 6 Under the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment "fishing operations," "trade," or "taking" could diminish
the effectiveness of IWC conservation efforts and trigger certificationY
The legislation provided that upon certification the Secretary of State
must impose sanctions. Specifically, the Secretary of State in consultation
with the Secretary of Commerce, must reduce the offending nation's fishing allocation in the United States EEZ by at least fifty percent.7 8 The
most important feature of the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment is its
nondiscretionary sanctions. Intended to give "teeth" to whale protection,
these sanctions force IWC violators to choose between whaling and fishing in the United States EEZ.Y9
The Secretary has yet to issue a certification under the PackwoodMagnuson Amendment." United States diplomats, however, argue that
the threat of sanctions has deterred five of the nine IWC whaling nations
from objecting to the 1982 commercial whaling moratorium. Additionally, Peru's withdrawal of its objection to the moratorium may be attributed in part to the threat of United States sanctions. Some Congressmen,
however, contend that the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly Amendments
have done little to promote whaling conservation because the amendments failed to persuade Norway, Japan, and the USSR to observe the
moratorium. 2 Despite this shortcoming, United States efforts have

76. Id. See also Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 137 (describes the
effects of both the Packwood-Magnuson and Pelly Amendments on United States whale
conservation policy).
77. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A) (1982). This provision expands the list of activities
that may trigger certification. Compare 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a)(1) (only fishing operations
trigger certification under the Pelly Amendment).

78. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(B).
79. 125 CoNG. REc. 21742, 21743 (1979). The intent of the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment was to increase significantly whale protection by sending a message to the
world that the United States would enforce the ICRW. See id. at 21743-44, 22083.
80. In 1980, United States diplomats used the threat of Packwood-Magnuson certification and sanctions to persuade Taiwan and the USSR to comply with IWO quotas.
Preparationsfor the 34th IWC Meeting, supra note 71, at 11-12.
81. See Hearing and Markup on H.R. Res. 3416, H. Con. Res. 69, H.R.J. Res.
136; Hearings Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs and Subcomm. Human
Rights and InternationalOrganizations,98th Cong., 2d Sess. 106 (1984) (statement of
Mark, Cheater, Legislative Director for Wildlife Issues, Greenpeace, U.S.A.) [hereinafter
Hearings I1].
82. See Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 139.

1987]

UNITED STATES WHALE POLICY

helped the IWO become more effective as an international body by buttressing its enforcement efforts."3 At the same time, Congress has asserted a foreign policy preference by directing negotiations toward
conservation. 8"
IV. THE CURRENT CONFLICT
When the IWO adopted the moratorium on commercial whaling, it set
the stage for a showdown. For the first time the IWO put whale protection ahead of the whaling industry's short term interests. As a result, the
division between whaling and nonwhaling members of the IWO widened. The IWC's scientific committee and the United Nations Food and
Agriculture Organization both criticized the moratorium because of its
lack of scientific basis.8 5 Additionally, the possibility of withdrawals by
and objections from the major whaling nations threatened to disintegrate
the IWC. 8
Although Congress and the President agree that conservation is the
ultimate goal, they disagree on the means for achieving conservation. 87
Congress supports trade and fishing sanctions.88 President Reagan, on
the other hand, threatens sanctions, but has yet to impose them.89 Congressmen have attacked the President for sacrificing whale protection for
other policy concerns such as balance of trade, tariffs and trade barriers.90 Any commercial whaling violates IWO regulations while the IWO

83. See Note, Hopson v. Kreps, supra note 36, at 243-44.
84. See Coggins, supra note 12, at 58. By adopting unilateral sanctions for IWC
violations, Congress put whale conservation above potential problems in international
law and foreign relations. Id. at 51. Congress seemed willing to take these risks because
conservation efforts had continually failed and whale protection was urgent. See id. at
51-52.
85. P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 616-174.
86. Id. at 624.
87. See Hearings I, supra note 33, at 294 (statement of Rep. Breaux).
88. See supra notes 62-70, 72-79 and accompanying text; see also 130 CONG. REC.
E4441 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman) (calls on President to use
his authority to help implement the IWC moratorium).
89. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text; see also President's Message to
the Congress on Whaling Activities of the U.S.S.R., 21 WEEKLY COMP. PaRs. Doc.
727-28 (June 3, 1985) (President explains his reasons for not invoking Pelly Amendment
sanctions but assures that he is working toward whale conservation) [hereinafter President's Message].
90. See Hearings I, supra note 33, at 283 (statement of Rep. Bonker). Representative Bonker alleged that the administration has enjoyed "the luxury" of saying it was
opposed to commercial whaling while actually pursuing conservation as little as possible.
Id. Bonker has argued further that economic sanctions should be invoked wherever ap-
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moratorium is in effect. Violations also trigger the Pelly or PackwoodMagnuson certifications and sanctions. Given this regulatory framework,
the question is whether the United States will implement the executive
or the congressional approach to achieve whale conservation."1
In the period between the moratorium's declaration and its commencement, both Congress and the President sought to avoid a confrontation.
Congress urged the President and Secretary of State to persuade Japan,
Norway, Peru, and the USSR to withdraw their objections."' Further,
the Department of State vowed to use all legal and diplomatic means
possible to carry out this task.9 3 This was not an easy undertaking because the United States position has appeared ambivalent, if not hypocritical." The United States has consistently threatened economic sanctions, but has refrained from imposing them by accepting compromises
from violating nations.9 5 Furthermore, while the United States objects to
commercial whaling, it continues to allow aboriginal whaling.9 6 Whether
one whales for profit or for culture, whales still die.97 As a result of these
apparent contradictions, the United States managed to persuade only one
state, Peru, to withdraw its objection to the moratorium.
Negotiations between the United States and the USSR were also unproductive. In April 1985, Secretary of State Baldridge certified the

plicable in order to insure that the threat of sanctions will be
Policy and Strategy, supra note 67, at 52-53.
91. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc.,
2860, 2873 (1986) (Marshall, J. dissenting).
92. See, e.g., H.R. Con. Res. 69; HearingsII, supra note
Rep. Bonker); 130 CONG. REc. E4441 (daily ed. Oct. 10,

believable. See Bonker on
-

U.S.

-,

106 S.Ct.

81, at 25-30 (statement of
1984) (statement of Rep.

Waxman).
93. See Hearings II, supra note 81, at 26-30 (statement of R. Tucker Scully, Department of State).
94. Bonker on Policy and Strategy, supra note 67, at 51. Saving whales has rarely
been a high priority in United States foreign policy. One weakness has been that the
United States lacks a comprehensive conservation policy from which to build an effective
strategy. Id.
95. See supra notes 71-74, 80-81 and accompanying text.
96. In 1977, the IWO removed the exemption by which Alaskan Eskimos took bowhead whales and placed a ban on the hunting of Arctic bowhead whales. See P. BmNIE,
supra note 1, at 485-86. The United States did not object. See Adams v. Vance, 570 F.2d
950 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court dismissed an action by Alaskan Eskimos to compel the Secretary of State to object to the IWO's measure). The United States played a key role in
rescinding the ban and having aboriginal whaling of Arctic bowheads reinstated on a
limited basis. See P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 500-01. United States law provides a
special exception which allows Alaskan Eskimos to hunt whales. See 16 U.S.C. §
1371(b) (1982).
97. See Hearings I, supra note 33, at 272 (statement of Rep. Breaux).
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USSR under the Pelly Amendment and the Packwood-Magnuson
Amendment. The Packwood-Magnuson Amendment sanctions were applied and the Soviet fishing allocation in the United States EEZ was cut
in half.9" However, President Reagan chose not to impose the Pelly
sanctions. The President, in a speech to Congress, noted the need for
whale conservation, but explained that cutting off the importation of Soviet fish products would not affect the Soviets' objection. 9 He speculated
that imposition of sanctions would be detrimental to the United States
because it would eliminate jobs generated by the joint United StatesUSSR fishing operation.'
Negotiations with Japan proved more successful. The United States
entered the negotiations fearing a direct economic confrontation.10 1 The
whaling issue traditionally has stirred animosity between Japan and the
United States because of their differing views on whale conservation. As
consumers of whales and whale products, the Japanese saw whale conservation as a threat to the supply of food resources.1 2 As nonconsumers,
the United States viewed the whale as a vital part of the world ecosystem
threatened by humans.1"' As negotiations continued, the United States
observed a decline in the Japanese whaling industry.l °4 On November
13, 1984, the Japanese agreed to withdraw their objection to the moratorium and suspend all commercial whaling by 1988. In return, the Secretaries of State and Commerce agreed: (1) not to certify any further Japanese violations of IWC quotas under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments, and (2) not to reduce any Japanese fishing allocations due
to certification."0 5
Before the agreement took effect, the American Cetacean Society and
other wildlife conservation groups filed suit in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia requesting declaratory and injunctive

98. See President's Message, supra note 89, at 728.
99. Id. at 727-28.
100. Id. at 728.

101.

See Hearings II, supra note 81, at 22 (statement of R. Tucker Scully, Depart-

ment of State).

102. Schmidhauser & Totten, Policy Proposalson the Whaling Issue: Product of the
Japanese-AmericanDeliberationin Two InternationalInterdisciplinaryConferences, in
THE WHAUNG ISSUE, supra note 6, at 257-58.
103. Id. at 265.
104. HearingsI, supra note 33, at 274-75 (statement of Dr. John Byrne, Administrator, Department of Commerce).
105. Commercial Whaling Harvest Agreement, Nov. 13, 1984, United States-Japan,
(not yet officially published, copy available from author).
T.I.A.S. No.
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relief.106 The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment claiming that the
Secretary of Commerce violated a statutory duty by not certifying that
Japanese whaling practices diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW.
The plaintiffs also moved to permanently enjoin the Secretaries of State
and Commerce from either agreeing not to certify Japanese whaling operations which exceed IWO quotas or not to cut Japanese fishing quotas
as a result of certification.10 7 The Japanese Whaling and Fisheries Associations intervened. 0 8 The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the plaintiffs, issued the desired order,10 9 and later denied a stay
pending appeal.110
The District of Columbia Circuit affirmed, but granted a ninety day
stay due to the foreign relations ramifications of the decision."' The appellate court focused on disputes of law and accepted the uncontroverted
fact that Japanese whaling companies, pursuant to an IWC objection,
took sperm whales in the 1984-85 season despite the IWO's zero quota
for sperm whales. The court framed the issue as a question of statutory
interpretation: whether the Pelly and the Packwood-Magnuson Amendments charged the Secretary of Commerce with a nondiscretionary, ministerial duty to certify to the President activities which diminish the
ICRW's effectiveness." 2 The court then considered whether mandamus
was the proper relief under the circumstances. 1 3
The court identified two steps in the certification process: (1) determining whether the activities had "diminished the effectiveness of the
international fishery program"; and (2) establishing the actual certification." 4 The court noted that the statute did not define "diminishing the
effectiveness," the standard for certification." 15 The court therefore reviewed legislative histories and other uses of the phrase in similar contexts. The court found that violation of an internationally-set quota con106. American Cetacean Soc. v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1398 (D.D.C. 1985).
The plaintiffs were frustrated with the ineffectiveness of whale conservation achieved by
the United States. Id. at 1401.

107. Id.
108. The Japanese companies as defendant-intervenors argued that: 1) due to their
objection, they were not technically violating the ICRW; and 2) permanent injunctive

relief was not appropriate in this situation. Id.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

Id. at 1411.
American Cetacean Soc. v. Baldridge [sic], 604 F. Supp. 1411, 1412.
American Cetacean Soc. v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d 426, 445 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
Id. at 432, 434.
Id. at 433.
See id. at 436.
Id. at 436; see also 16 U.S.C. § 1821(e)(2)(A)(1); 22 U.S.C. § 1978(a) (1982).
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stitutes per se diminishing the effectiveness of the quota.11 The court
concluded that although the Secretary of Commerce has discretion to certify in some situations,117 the Secretary had no discretion in this case. 1
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C. Circuit.119 The Court held that the dispute presented a justiciable issue, but
determined that the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments did
not require the Secretary to certify all violations of IWC quotas. The

majority first rejected the Japanese petitioners' contention that the case
presented a nonjusticiable political question.2 The Court acknowledged
that the dispute involved foreign affairs, but stated that the crucial issue
was a justiciable question of statutory interpretation.2 Relying on
Baker v. Carr, 22 the Court explained that not every question which has

foreign policy ramifications presents a nonjusticiable dispute. 23
Proceeding to the merits, the Court considered "whether, in the cir-

cumstances of these cases, either the Pelly or Packwood [-Magnuson]
Amendment required the Secretary to certify Japan for refusing to abide
by the IWC whaling quotas."1 24 The Court stated the statute did not
require certification until the Secretary established that a nation's activi-

116. See 768 F.2d at 435-43. Past practice supports this view. That is, whaling in
excess of IWO limits has triggered certification in prior instances. See supra notes 71-74
and accompanying text.
117. The Secretary of Commerce would have discretion when actions do not violate
the IWC regulations technically, but undermine the achievement of the regulations. See
id. at 434.
118. See id. at 443.
119. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986). Justice White wrote the majority opinion joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice Marshall authored the dissenting opinion joined by
Brennan, Blackmun, and Rehnquist.
120. Id. at 2866. The Japan Whaling Association argued that the issue was not
proper for judicial decision because a judicial decision would result in a wide variety of
public statements by the co-ordinate branches of the United States government. This
argument was based on the prudential considerations discussed in Baker v. Carr, 369
U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
The circuit court never addressed the issue squarely. The court tacitly adhered to the
doctrine by identifying the issue as one of statutory interpretation. See American Cetacean Soc. v. Baldrige, 768 F.2d at 432. In dissent, Judge Oberdorfer accused the circuit
court of ignoring the justiciability problems. Id. at 447 (Oberdorfer, J., dissenting).
Oberdorfer concluded that the dispute presented a nonjusticiable issue because of the
complicated foreign policy ramifications. Id.
121. Japan Whaling Association, 106 S.Ct. at 2866.
122. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
123. 106 S.Ct. at 2866.
124. Id. at 2867.
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ties "'diminishe[d] the effectiveness' of the ICRW."1 25 The Court observed that the statute does not state that whaling in excess of IWG quotas diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW. Instead, Congress left the
phrase undefined. Because Congress did not define the standard, the
Court deferred to the Secretary's interpretation. 126
The Court again reviewed the legislative histories of the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to determine whether the Secretary's
interpretation contradicted congressional intent. The Court cited Committee and House Reports that specifically state that the Secretary did
not have an absolute duty to certify all violations of internationally-set
conservation quotas. 21 Further, the Court stressed that passage of the
28
Packwood Amendment did not change the standard for certification.
The Amendment, rather, required mandatory sanctions upon certification. The Court concluded that the legislative history did not prohibit the
Secretary's interpretation. In addition to its statutory analysis, the Court
justified its result on policy grounds. Securing Japan's compliance with
IWC quotas in the future would better serve whale conservation than
imposing sanctions for past conduct in hopes of coercing future
compliance. 21
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall argued that the Secretary
lacked the discretion necessary to make the agreement because Japan's
whaling in excess of IWC quotas per se diminished the effectiveness of
the ICRW and, therefore, warranted certification. The dissent affirmed
the lower court's objection to the Secretary's interpretation of the standard for certification used in the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
Amendments. 3 Marshall explained that the majority, the lower courts,
and even the parties themselves overlooked the most direct approach to
resolution of the dispute. He emphasized that the facts demonstrate that
Japanese past conduct diminished the effectiveness of the ICRW.13 1 Furthermore, the dissent argued that the legislative history of the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson Amendments lent no support to the Secretary's interpretation of his powers. 3 2
Justice Marshall prefaced his legal analysis with a survey of past
United States practice under the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2868.
127. Id. at 2868-70.
128. Id. at 2870-71.

129. Id. at 2871.
130. Id. at 2873 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 2873-74.

132. Id. at 2875-76.
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Amendments.13 3 He observed that in all prior cases the Secretary certified violations of IWC quotas. He stated that the Secretary appeared to
act under a duty to certify violations of IWC whaling quotas.' Each of
the certified violations went unsanctioned, however, under the Pelly
Amendment. President Reagan instead threatened sanctions under the
Pelly Amendment and certification under Packwood-Magnuson to persuade the violators to follow IWC schedules in the future. Justice Marshall argued that Congress passed the Packwood-Magnuson Amendment
because the President treated IWC violators too softly.13 5 Consequently,
Marshall viewed this case as one fight in the continuing battle over
which branch of government should determine United States whale
policy.
In his legal analysis, Marshall considered whether the Japanese
through their past conduct had diminished the effectiveness of the
ICRW. 3 8 Marshall found that no one, not even the Secretary of Commerce, contended that Japanese whaling in excess of IWC quotas did
not diminish the effectiveness of the ICRW. Marshall quoted a letter
written prior to the executive agreement with Japan in which the Secretary stated that whaling in excess of IWC quotas warranted certification."3 ' Marshall concluded that the undisputed facts demonstrate that
Japan took sperm whales in excess of the amount specified by the IWC.
In addition, given the Secretary's prior practice, he did not have discretion to withhold certification. 3 8
Marshall defended the lower courts' interpretations of the statutes, 189
arguing that the majority ignored legislative intent that whaling in excess
of IWC quotas would mandate certification. Although the Secretary may
have discretion over certification when the violations are negligible, Japan's continued whaling in spite of an IWC ban was not a negligible
133. Id. at 2872-73. The dissent quotes a letter Secretary Baldrige had written in
response to correspondence he received from Senator Packwood. Id. at 2873-74. The
dissent also quoted excerpts from Packwood's letter which stated that he expected any
whaling in excess of the IWO moratorium to warrant certification. Id. at 2873.
134. Id. at 2072.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2874.
137. See id. at 2873-74. Marshall added that the Secretary's actions indicate that he
wished to rewrite the law. Specifically, the Secretary used his power over the certification
decision to side-step the sanction mandated by Congress. Id. at 2876.
138. Id. at 2874-76.
139. Id. at 2876. The dissent stated further that it was, "troubled that this Court
[the majority] is empowering an officer of the Executive Branch, sworn to uphold and
defend the laws of the United States, to ignore Congress'..." will on how to pursue
whale conservation. Id.
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incident.1 40
As a result of the division on this Supreme Court decision, the executive prevailed in the United States showdown on whale conservation.
Consequently, the United States has adopted a compromise approach to
whale conservation. Any notion that IWC violations mandate sanctions
from the United States is eliminated. Therefore, the Pelly and
Packwood-Magnuson provisions become discretionary sanctions which
the executive may invoke if it chooses to adopt a hard-line approach to
whale conservation. If Congress wishes to impose mandatory sanctions
on IWC violators, it will have to pass another statute.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions invite criticism. The majority's treatment of the political question doctrine was incomplete because
it characterized the issue as one of statutory interpretation. Similarly, the
dissent ignored an important issue - the effect of an executive agreement on a prior inconsistent statute. The dissent stated that the Secretary
of Commerce lacked the authority to conclude the agreement but failed
to carry the argument to its logical conclusion. The dissent's approach
invalidates an executive agreement. United States law is not clear on
whether this is possible. The remainder of this Note will consider the
political question and executive agreement issues raised by this dispute
but not rigorously addressed by the Court.
V.

JAPAN WHALING ASSOCIATION V. AMERICAN CETACEAN SOCIETY

UNDER A COMPLETE POLITICAL QUESTION ANALYSIS

A majority of the Supreme Court disposed of the Japan Whaling Association's claim that the controversy was inappropriate for judicial resolution without thoroughly considering that claim. By characterizing the
issue as statutory interpretation, the Court sidestepped a political question analysis.1 4 A thorough analysis of this case under the political
question doctrine reveals the strength of the Japanese petitioner's
contention.
The political question doctrine grew out of the constitutional requirement of live "cases or controversies"'142 and from principles of separation
of powers. The leading case, Baker v. Carr,243 surveyed prior case law
and articulated a six part inquiry for political question analysis:

140.

See id. at 2866.

See Note, Hopson v. Kreps, supra note 36, at 231-32. See also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
142. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210. See generally Note, Hopson v. Kreps,
141.

supra note 36, at 231-41 (discussing the political question doctrine since Baker).
143.

369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue
to a coordinate political department; or [21 a lack of judicially discoverable
and manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind dearly for nonjudicial discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches
of government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one

question.""

The Baker Court indicated that its test applied to all political question
analyses whether raised in a domestic or foreign relations context.14 5

By including a discussion of justiciability in the foreign affairs context,
the Baker Court sought to eliminate the confusion surrounding the political question doctrine.146 Previously, the Supreme Court indicated that

issues involving foreign relations were by nature nonjusticiable political
questions.114 The Baker Court replaced this approach to foreign relations issues with the six part test, noting that courts must undertake a
"discriminating analysis" of both past practices in similar situations and

of the ramifications and consequences of a judicial determination.' 48 As a
result of the Baker decision, courts have given extra consideration to the
last four elements of the six part test, 49 labeling these factors the "pru-

dential considerations."' 5 0

Courts generally defer to foreign relations decisions made by the executive and legislative - the "political" - branches.' As a rule, courts

144. Id. at 217.
145. See id. at 211-13, 217; Note, Hopson v. Kreps, supra note 36, at 235. The
dispute in Baker focused on a state voter apportionment statute.
146. See 369 U.S. at 211. The Court remarked, "it is error to suppose that every
case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." Id.
at 211.
147. See, e.g., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950); Oetjen v. Central
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
148. 569 U.S. at 211-12.
149. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger, 745 F.2d 1500, 1513-15 (D.C.
Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 105 S.Ct. 2353 (1985); Mitchell v.
Laird, 488 F.2d 611, 616 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247, 25354 (D.D.C. 1985); Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge [sic], 549 F. Supp. 108, 110
(D.D.C. 1982). But see Hopson v. Kreps, 622 F.2d 1375, 1378-81 (9th Cir. 1980).
150. See Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1513.
151. See, e.g., Reagan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589 (1952).
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consider challenges to the desirability, wisdom, or propriety of foreign
policy as nonjusticiable political questions.1 52 Courts have found justiciable issues in the foreign affairs context when the dispute involves constitutional rights, treaties, statutes, congressional directives, administrative
procedures, or personal rights.15
A.

The Baker Tests in the Foreign Affairs Context
1. Prong One: Textual Commitment

Determining to which branch the Constitution commits decisionmaking power "turns on an examination of the constitutional provisions governing the exercise of the power in question." 1 " Based on the Constitution, courts have declared that the following decisionmaking powers are
implicitly or explicitly committed to the political branches: the power to
recognize foreign governments;15 5 the power to dispose of foreign aid;" 6
the power to settle mutual claims with foreigners;157 the power to set
military policy; 58 the power to regulate international commerce; 5 the
power to adopt the regulations of international organizations; 60 and the
power to establish foreign policy. 11

152. See, e.g., Harisiades,342 U.S. at 589-90; Johnson, 339 U.S. at 789.
153. See Note, Hopson v. Kreps, supra note 36, at 231-33. The political question
doctrine acts to restrain the exercise, rather than the existence of federal judicial power.
Id. at 232.
154. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998 (1979) (Powell, J. concurring in the
judgment); See also Flynn v. Schultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1191 (7th Cir. 1984).
155. See, e.g., Oeten, 246 U.S. at 302; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1007 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing foreign governments is the power of the President); Occidental of
Umm al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum Laden Aboard the Tanker
Dauntless Colocotronis, 577 F.2d 1196, 1203 (5th Cir. 1978).
156. See Dickson v. Ford, 521 F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975).
157. See, e.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 683 (1981) (power of the
executive when interdependent with recognizing a foreign government); United States v.
Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
158. See, e.g., Johnson, 339 U.S. at 789; Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1513-14;
Crockett v. Reagan, 720 F.2d 1355, 1356 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam), cert. den., 467

U.S. 1251 (1984).
159. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333
U.S. 103, 111 (1948); Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 143
(D.C. Cir. 1974).
160. See, e.g., United States v. Decker, 600 F.2d 733, 737 (9th Cir. 1979); Jensen v.
National Marine Fisheries Serv., 512 F.2d 1189, 1191 (9th Cir. 1975); Cranston, 611
F. Supp. at 253.
161. See, e.g., Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81 (1976); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S.
1, 17 (1965); Harisiades,342 U.S. at 589; Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1512.

1987]

UNITED STATES WHALE POLICY

The Baker Court, however, explained that "courts cannot reject as 'no
law suit' a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated
'political' exceeds Constitutional authority."1 2 When a "political" case
focuses on personal rights or statutory interpretation, courts have the
decisionmaking power."' 3 The Court seemed concerned that "political"
labels rather than the nature of the issues would determine the outcome
of the political question inquiry."6
The Constitution's vague allocation of foreign affairs powers invites
competition between the political branches.'6 5 When these separation of
powers disputes arise, the judicial branch claims the textually committed
authority to settle them."6 6 Courts seldom settle these "boundary disputes.'1 6 7 A court may instead find another justiciability problem and
dismiss the case,'6" or alternatively dismiss the case and wait for the
controversy to reach a stalemate or constitutional impasse.' 69 Because the
law remains unsettled as to the question of whether a direct conflict between the political branches presents a justiciable issue, the executive
7
and legislative branches continue to dispute their respective authority.7'
For the most part, foreign affairs questions remain immune from judicial
inquiry because the Constitution vests so much authority over foreign
affairs in the political branches.'
2.

Prong Two: Appropriate Standards

The second Baker prong basically tests whether a court requires dedsionmaking standards other than traditional judicial discovery and management. 17 2 Under this test courts find no justiciability problem when the
162. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 90 (1972).
166. See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Goldwater, 444
U.S. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting); Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 614. The rationale is that
settling separation of powers disputes is part of the judiciary's duty to interpret the law.
444 U.S. at 1007 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. L. HENKIN, supra note 165, at 209-10.
168. E.g., Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1191-93 (dismissed for prudential reasons); Mitchell,
488 F.2d at 616 (dismissed because the necessary evidence was inaccessible).
169. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1001 (Powell, J. concurring in the judgment).
170. See Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1191 n.5; L. HENKIN, supra note 165, at 92.
171. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 999 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
172. See id. at 1000; see also Baker, 369 U.S. at 214 (discusses the rationale behind
this part of the political question analysis). The rationale is that statutory and constitutional interpretation require "no special competence or information beyond the reach" of
the usual judicial inquiry. 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment).
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issue is statutory or constitutional interpretation.178 In Ramirez de Arellano v. Weinberger,174 for example, a United States citizen sought compensation from the United States government because it seized some of
his land in El Salvador for a military training post. The court held that
it possessed the decisionmaking standards necessary to decide the case
because resolution of the dispute hinged on statutory and constitutional
interpretation.'75
But courts have refused to pass on the merits of cases which involved a
standardless decision"' 8 or of cases in which the necessary information
was inaccessible.1 "7 In Flynn v. Schultz,1' 8 the court dismissed a suit to
compel the Secretary of State to order a United States diplomat to testify
in a civil trial. The Flynn court reasoned that the statutory standard,
"unjustly deprived of liberty," required a subjective inquiry beyond a
court's competence.17 9 Similarly, the court in Crockett v. Reagan180 refused to consider the merits of a claim that the President had violated his
legal duty to report to Congress about the activities of United States military personnel in El Salvador. The Crockett court explained that it
could not rule on the case because the resources and expertise necessary
to solve the factual dispute were not available to the courts.," In sum,
courts have been reluctant to solve disputes involving foreign affairs in
which resolution would require either a subjective inquiry or evidence
which is beyond the court's control.
3. Prong Three: Prudential Considerations
Traditionally courts avoided foreign affairs cases because the judiciary
was ill-equipped to handle the delicacies and complexities of interna173. 745 F.2d at 1500.
174. 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 105 S.

Ct. 2353 (1985).
175. Id. at 1513. The court stated that the plaintiff's entitlement to compensation
required only a decision on the government's authority to occupy and use the plaintiff's
property. The court held it was competent to decide the case because the plaintiff's claim
did not challenge United States foreign policy. Id.
176. See, e.g., Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1003 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment) (the decision whether to abrogate a treaty involved political standards which were
not subject to judicial review); Flynn, 748 F.2d at 1193.
177. See, e.g., Crockett, 720 F.2d at 1356; Mitchell, 488 F.2d at 616 (most of the
relevant evidence was inaccessible because it was held by foreign governments or was
privileged).
178. 748 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1984).
179. Id. at 1193.
180. 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam).
181. Id. at 1356.
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tional relations.1 8 2 The last four prongs of the Baker test reflect this
traditional notion. Specifically, the third prong discourages judicial determination of issues that would initially require a foreign policy decision." 8 The fourth prong adds that a court should not decide a case in
which a judicial decision may demonstrate a lack of respect for the policy
choices made by the other branches of government. Similarly, the fifth
prong states that courts should not decide controversies in which the nation should stand behind a previously made political decision.'" Finally,
the sixth prong prohibits judicial decisions which result in embarrassment caused by "multifarious pronouncements." 8 5 The common concern
of the four prudential considerations is that judicial resolution may disturb foreign policy and therefore undermine United States diplomacy. 8 6
For example, the dispute in Cranston v. Reagan1 17 involved an executive agreement pertaining to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Although the Administration concluded the agreement pursuant to statutory authorization and subsequent congressional approval, the plaintiffs
alleged that the Secretary of State exceeded his authority when making
the pact. The Cranston court acknowledged that it had authority and
competence to settle the dispute, but refrained, reasoning that the court
should not question "agreements which are the product of delicate and
extensive international negotiation." ' 8 The consequences to a unified
foreign policy undermined by judicial decisionmaking may encourage abstention by courts which otherwise have the authority to resolve political
questions.

182. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111.
183. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (once a political decision is
made concerning which government to recognize as the sovereign of a foreign country,
the judiciary should not review it).
184. See Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Baldridge [sic], 549 F. Supp. 108, 110 (D.D.C.
1982); but see Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d 1500 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The Dresser
Industries court explained that the national interest of maintaining a firm foreign policy
stance outweighs the individual's claim. Id. The foreign policy matter at issue was the
United States response to events in Poland. Id.
185. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217. See Cranston v. Reagan, 611 F. Supp. 247, 253
(D.D.C. 1985).
186. Put another way, the thrust of the prudential considerations is to prevent judicial decisions on the merits of cases due to reasons other than judicial competence or the
language of the constitution. See Cranston, 611 F. Supp. at 253.
187. 611 F. Supp. 247 (D.D.C. 1985).
188. Id. at 253. The court added that the plaintiffs had other recourse, but failed to
utilize it. That is, the three plaintiffs who served in Congress had the opportunity to
block the agreement when it was considered for approval in the Congress. Id. at 253-54.
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B. Political Question Challenges to United States Whale Conservation
Policy
In two prior cases dealing with United States whale conservation policy federal courts considered the applicability of the political question
doctrine. In Adams v. Vance, 89 Alaskan Eskimos sought an order to
compel the Secretary of State to file an objection to the IWC's 1977 ban
on the hunting of Arctic bowhead whales. The Adams court dismissed
the suit because the plaintiffs failed to establish that they were entitled to
relief.' 90 The court speculated that even if the plaintiffs had demonstrated their right to relief, the issue would not be justiciable because an
order compelling an objection to the IWC ban would undermine the
United States' position as a leader in whale conservation efforts."9 "
Alaskan Eskimos again challenged United States whale conservation
policy in Hopson v. Kreps.'9 2 In Hopson, the district court dismissed the
claim because the dispute raised a nonjusticiable political question. The
district court applied the six-part Baker test and found justiciability
problems under each prong."9" The Ninth Circuit, however, reversed
finding no political question problems."" The court characterized the issue as statutory and treaty interpretation, noted that the judiciary's role
was to determine the law, and concluded that the district court erroneously dismissed the case.195 Commentators criticized the Ninth Circuit's
analysis because it failed to pursue the political question inquiry beyond
the first prong of the Baker test."9"
In Japan Whaling Association, the Supreme Court held that the
case did present a justicable question.' 98 The Court addressed the first
two elements of the Baker test, but failed to consider fully the prudential
factors in the analysis.' 99 The Court implicitly considered the first prong
by declaring that the judiciary's role was to resolve questions of statutory
189. 570 F.2d 950 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
190. Id. at 954-57.
191. Id. at 954.
192. 462 F. Supp. 1374 (D. Alaska 1979), rev'd, 622 F.2d 1375 (9th Cir. 1980).
The plaintiffs claimed that the Secretary of Commerce, as their legal trustee, had a duty
to object to the IWC's regulations on noncommercial Arctic whaling. 462 F. Supp. at
1377.
193. 462 F. Supp. at 1382-83.
194. 622 F.2d at 1378.
195. Id. at 1378-80.
196. See Note, Hopson v. Kreps, supra note 36, at 253-54.

197. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc., 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986).
198. Id. at 2866.
199. See id.
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interpretation."' The Supreme Court approached the second prong in a
similar fashion. The Court explained that appropriate standards of judicial decisionmaking were available because resolution of the case
"call[ed] for applying no more than the traditional rules of statutory construction ... ,2 Without mentioning the second Baker prong explicitly, the Court declared that its approach in Japan Whaling Association
22
employed traditional standards of decisionmaking.
The Court mentioned two prudential factors, but failed to analyze
them. Specifically, the Court acknowledged the Japanese petitioners'
contention that a decision on the merits would result in the type of "multifarious pronouncement" against which Baker cautioned.2 03 In addition,
the Court recognized that the dispute centered on the relationship between the statute and the political branches.2 ' However, the Court's discussion of the Baker prudential considerations went no further.2 0 5 Nowhere did the Court consider the ramifications of a decision on the
merits.
The ramifications of the Court's decision extend beyond determining
the Secretary of Commerce's discretion in certifying violations of IWC
quotas. First, the Court endorsed the Secretary's interpretation of the
statute despite apparently contradictory legislative history.206 Second, the
Court left the United States with only discretionary sanctions to persuade countries to comply with IWC schedules.20 7 Third, the Court's
decision validated an executive agreement despite its apparent conflict
with a federal statute.20 8 Finally, by finding a justiciable controversy and
reaching a decision on the merits, the Court chose to cast the deciding
vote in a separation of powers dispute over foreign policy.
Furthermore, by neglecting to consider the effects of its decision, the
Court ignored the last four parts of the Baker analysis. Considering only

the first two prongs of the test left the Court free to render a decision. By
choosing to render a decision on the merits rather than dismissing the
case for nonjusticiability, the Court contributed to "multifarious pro-

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
115-18,
207.
208.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2865.
Id. at 2866.
See id.
Compare supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text with supra notes 78-79,
136-37 and accompanying text.
See supra note 75-79, 137 and accompanying text.
See supra note 127-29 and accompanying text.
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nouncements" on United States whale policy. 20 Most disturbingly, how-

ever, the Court shaped foreign policy. The Court pronounced in effect
that the United States is willing to compromise on whale policy.

Whether a thorough political question analysis would yield a justiciable issue is not as important as careful consideration of all the ramifications of a judicial decision on the merits. Ignoring the prudential consid-

erations of the Baker test means reversing entirely the old notion that
foreign affairs issues were by nature nonjusticable. The prudential con-

siderations retain the prior sensitivity to judicial interference in foreign
policy. While the United States has an interest in settling separation of

powers disputes, it also has an interest in remaining a trustworthy partner in diplomatic negotiations. 1 Traditionally, the judiciary has not
played a major role in setting foreign policy. In Japan Whaling Association, however, the Court sets a dangerous precedent because it resolved a
foreign policy

dispute by characterizing the issue

as statutory

interpretation.
VI. THE JAPAN-UNITED STATES WHALE CONSERVATION
AGREEMENT UNDER UNITED STATES LAW

The Japan Whaling Association majority endorsed the Secretary of
Commerce's interpretation of the statutes and consequently upheld the
agreement with Japan. 21" The dissent argued that the Secretary had no
statutory authority to make a compromise agreement.2 112 Had the Court
adopted the dissent's reasoning and affirmed the lower courts, it would
have rendered the executive agreement ineffective. Although the Secretary may have violated his statutory duty, the dissent's analysis avoided
the unsettled issue of whether an executive agreement supersedes prior
inconsistent federal law.
The Constitution does not specify the status of executive agreements,
but courts have afforded them "similar dignity" as treaties in superseding state law.2 18 When a treaty and a federal statute conflict, courts apply a later-in-time rule under which a treaty supersedes any prior, in-

209. See American Cetacean Soc. v. Baldrige [sic], 768 F.2d at 447-48 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (Oberdorfer, J. dissenting), rev'd sub. nom. Japan Whaling Assn' v. American
Cetacean Soc., 106 S.Ct. 2860 (1986).
210. See Save the Executive, Wall St., J. Feb. 25, 1986, at 30, col. 1.
211. See 106 S. Ct. at 2872.
212. See 106 S.Ct. at 2876 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
213. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 230 (1942). See also United States v.
Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937).
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consistent federal law.2" 4 If a court attributed treaty status to an
executive agreement, it too would supersede prior inconsistent federal
law.
Executive agreements, however, have not received that treatment. In
United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc.,215 the Fourth Circuit held that an
executive agreement could not supersede prior federal law.2"' In Capps,
the dispute arose when a trade agreement with Canada regarding the
importation of potatoes contradicted a prior statute.21 7 The Capps court
characterized the issue as a fight over the regulation of international
commerce and concluded that the prior statute must be given effect over
the sole agreement.2"" The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the actions of
one person could not nullify an act of Congress. 2 9 The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision on other grounds but expressly refused to discuss
the executive agreement issue. 220 Nevertheless, the Restatement (Second)
of Foreign Relations Law of the United States adopted the Fourth Circuit's view.221
The tentative drafts of the Restatement (Revised) of Foreign Relations
of the United States indicated that the issue remains unsettled. The first
tentative draft stated that executive agreements do supersede prior, inconsistent federal law. 222 This adopted the approach taken by Louis
Henkin in ForeignAffairs and the Constitution.223 Henkin stressed the
President's unique role in foreign affairs and argued that all constitu-

214. See The Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884). See generally Note,
Superseding Statutory Law By Sole Executive Agreement: An Analysis of the American
Law Institute's Shift in Position, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 671, 671-72 (1983) [hereinafter
Superseding Statutory Law] (discusses how courts handle conflicts of statutes and treaties). The converse is true as well. Superseding Statutory Law, at 671.
215. 204 F.2d 655 (4th Cir. 1953), affd on other grounds, 348 U.S. 296 (1955).
216. 204 F.2d at 658.
217. Id. at 657.
218. See id. at 659-60.
219. See id. at 658-59; see also RESTATEMENT (REvISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (Tent. Draft No. 6) § 135, Reporter's Note 5 (1985)
[hereinafter Tentative Draft No. 6].
220. 348 U.S. at 305.
221. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 144(1)(b) (1965) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (SECOND)].
222. RESTATEMENT (REVISED) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 135(1) (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1980) [hereinafter Tent. Draft No. 1]; see generally Superseding Statutory Law, supra note 213, at 671-96 (critical analysis of the tentative draft's position; suggests it should be discarded). See also Tent. Draft. No. 1, §
308.
223. SupersedingStatutory Law, supra note 213, at 675; see L. HNKIN, supra note
165, at 186.
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tional acts of power should have the same status. 224 However, the sixth
tentative draft retreated from this position 22 5 and only addressed the issue in its comments and notes.2 26 Comment (c) indicated that an executive agreement may supersede prior federal law depending on the authority on which the agreement was based.2 27 Furthermore, comment (c)
identified three bases of authority for executive agreements and laid out
three corresponding categories: a) agreements pursuant to the President's
own authority (sole executive agreements); b) agreements pursuant to
treaties (treaty-agreements); and c) agreements pursuant to congressional
authorization (congressional-executive agreements). 228 As comment (c)
indicates, treaty-agreements and congressional-executive agreements are
capable of superseding prior inconsistent federal statutes. Reporter's note
5 discussed at length the power of a sole executive agreement. Although
the note laid down no blanket rule, it discussed the precedents and indicated that agreements pertaining to diplomacy or the recognition of governments would indeed supersede prior law.2 29
Sole executive agreements carry as much constitutional authority on a
subject as the President has with respect to that subject.28 0 When entering an agreement, the President may draw from his constitutional authority as Chief Executive or Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces,
his power to appoint ambassadors, or his duty to execute the laws.2"'
The Supreme Court dealt with agreements based on the President's clear
authority in United States v. Belmont 3 2 and United States v. Pink"'
where, in both cases, the Court held that executive agreements supersede
prior inconsistent state laws. 2a In each case the Court upheld the sole
executive agreement because it was interdependent with the recognition
of a foreign government and reflected the President's authority over for-

224. L. HENKIN, supra note 165, at 184-88. Furthermore, American jurisprudence
does not recognize another level of federal law somewhere above state law but somewhere below federal law. See Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 218, § 135 Reporter's Note
5.
225. Compare Tent. Draft No. 1, supra note 222, § 135(1) with Tent. Draft No. 6,
supra note 2214, § 135.
226. See Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 219, § 135 comment c, reporter's note 5.
227. See Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 219, § 135 comment c.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. See Superseding Statutory Law, supra note 213, at 684-86.
231. Id. at 684-86; see U.S. CONsT. art. II §§ 1-3.
232. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
233. 301 U.S. 324 (1937).
234. See 301 U.S. at 331; 315 U.S. at 230.

1987]

UNITED STATES WHALE POLICY

eign affairs.23 5 The dispute in Capps, however, pitted an executive
agreement against a prior federal statute regulating international commerce. The Fourth Circuit found that the agreement was ineffective because the executive agreement contravened prior Congressional policy. 2 6
Unlike Belmont or Pink, the case did not involve the executive's clear
authority.
Treaty-agreements such as agreements made under the United Na37
tions treaty and agreements executed to implement the NATO treaty
draw authority from both the treaty's constitutional status as supreme
law of the land and from the President's duty to carry out the law. 2m
Generally, treaty-agreements receive the same status as the treaty itself. 239 Problems develop, however, when the agreement exceeds the language and intended scope of the treaty.2 4 °
Congress may authorize international executive agreements before or
after the President makes an agreement.24 1 When Congress delegates
portions of its foreign affairs power, the President acts with the sum of
his power and the power of Congress. 24 21 Congressional-executive agreements, therefore, carry the constitutional authority of both Congress and
the President. The only limitation on presidential authority would be the
limits provided in the statute which grants authority to enter into the
agreement. 243 Additionally, Congress may agree to executive agreements
by drafting the necessary implementing legislation, by appropriating
funds, or by refusing to challenge the agreement.24 4 A congressional
235. See 301 U.S. at 331; 315 U.S. at 230.
236. Capps, 204 F.2d at 659.
237. See Note, Executive Agreements: Beyond Constitutional Limits, 11 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 805, 811-12 and n.33 (1983) (general discussion of treaty-agreements) [hereinafter Note, Executive Agreements].
238. See id. See also Superseding Statutory Law, supra note 213, at 684; U.S.
CONsT. arts. II, § 3, VI.
239. See Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 218, § 135 comment c.
240. See Note, Executive Agreements, supra note 237, at 812-14. A treaty-agreement
may supercede prior federal law just as a treaty would provide the treaty-agreement
comports to the language and intent of the treaty. Id.
241. See Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 219, § 135 comment c. See, e.g., Dames &
Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 674-75, 687-88 (1981); American Bitumuls & Asphalt
Co. v. United States, 146 F. Supp. 703, 708 (Cust. Ct. 1956).
242. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
109-10 (1948).
243. See, e.g., Miranda v. Secretary of Treasury, 766 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1985);
United States v. Yoshida Int'l Inc., 526 F.2d 560, 582 (C.C.P.A. 1975); American Bitumuls & Asphalt Co., 146 F. Supp. at 711-12.
244. L. HENKIN, supra note 165, at 173-75 (appropriating funds). See Dames &
Moore, 453 U.S. at 687-88 (not challenging agreement); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d
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challenge to an executive agreement may suggest that the President acted

outside of his authority and necessitate a separation of powers
analysis.2 45
In Dames & Moore v. Regan,2 " the Supreme Court upheld an execu-

tive agreement with Iran for a settlement of mutual claims. The Court
noted that the agreement drew authority from the President's power to

recognize foreign governments because it involved recognition of the new
government in Iran.24 7 The Court added that Congress authorized the
agreement through both prior legislation and acquiescence to prior
2 48

practice.

If Congress does not challenge a treaty-agreement or congressional-

executive agreement it is most enforceable because, given the opportunity, Congress declined to address the particular issue or to challenge
executive authority. 49 The enforcement of agreements which Congress

does not challenge also conforms to Justice Jackson's three zones of presidential authority described in his concurrence in Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer.2 50 A treaty-agreement has, at the least, executive
authority behind it. A congressional-executive agreement bears both ex-

ecutive and congressional constitutional authority. Either of these agreements may therefore preempt prior federal law.251

When Congress speaks directly against an agreement, rejects an agreement, or claims that the Executive has exceeded boundaries of authority,

conflicts arise. The dispute necessitates a comparison of the constitutional
authority of each branch with respect to the issue.

52

For example, courts

611, 615 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (various forms of assent); Leary, InternationalExecutive
Agreements, 72 L. LIBR. J. 1, 4 (1979) (implementation legislation).
245. If a conflict arises, the inquiry may turn to a separation of powers analysis
under Justice Jackson's three categories of executive power described in Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952) (Jackson, J. concurring).
Jackson stated that in situations of conflict with Congress, the President would be acting
with the least amount of authority. The President's authority would be the difference
between his constitutional authority and that of Congress. Id. at 637-38.
246. 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
247. See id. at 683 (citing Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1951)).
248. See id. at 677, 686. The Dames & Moore court cited Justice Frankfurter's
concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 610-11, that an executive
order has great authority when the order is part of an ongoing, continuous practice
which had yet to be challenged by Congress. Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. at 686.
249. See L. HENKIN, supra note 165, at 175-76.
250. 343 U.S. 637, 678 (Jackson, J. concurring).
251. This possibility is left open by § 135 of'Tent. Draft No. 6, supra note 219, §
135 comment c, reporter's note 5.
252. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 678 (Jackson, J. concurring);
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have held that executive orders which exceed the scope of the international trade regulation power granted by Congress are void. 253 Because
trade regulations restrict international commerce, a president's actions
which exceed his authority are ineffective. This result is consistent with
the Jackson analysis because executive acts which contradict prior congressional acts carry the least amount of constitutional authority.2 " In

an area of congressional prominence such as international commerce,
legislative will is more persuasive than executive will. Yet if the issue
were the recognition of a foreign government, the executive's pronouncement would be controlling because of constitutional authority and past
practice.
Characterization of the issues, therefore, plays a key role in assessing
the validity of an executive agreement. The first determination is
whether the agreement is a sole agreement, a treaty agreement, or a congressional-executive agreement. The second determination is whether the
political branches conflict on an issue. The third determination is the
nature of the issue itself. Application of this three-part test to the Japan
Whaling Association case indicates that the majority's result was not
improper.
Neither the majority nor the dissent in Japan Whaling Association
discussed in detail the legal effect of the executive agreement with Japan.
The majority did not reach the issue because it found that the conduct by
the Secretary of Commerce did not contradict congressional intent.2 5
Justice Marshall's dissent, on the other hand, held that the Secretary
had no statutory authority to execute the agreement and declared that
the Secretary's actions contradicted congressional policy.2"' The dissent,
however, failed to pursue the issue any further.
The dissent treated the agreement as a sole executive agreement which
attempted to regulate international commerce and contradicted the will
of Congress.25 The dissent indicated, first, that the agreement derives
authority only from the executive branch because it contains no references to any treaties, statutes, or congressional directives which charge
the executive with a duty to negotiate whale conservation agreements.
Second, Justice Marshall characterized the context of the dispute as insee also United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
253. See, e.g., Yoshida Int'l, Inc., 526 F.2d at 582-83; American Bitumuls &
Asphalt Co., 146 F. Supp. at 710-12. Cf. Miranda, 766 F.2d at 5 (upheld President's
order that was rationally related to his statutory authority).
254. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 637-38 (Jackson, J. concurring).
255. See 106 S. Ct. at 2872.
256. See id. at 2874, 2876 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
257. See id. at 2872-74.
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ternational commerce. 58 Last, the dissent cited the legislative history of
the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments to illustrate a conflict
of policy between the legislative and executive branches."
The dissent, therefore, would have affirmed the Fourth Circuit result
in Capps by rendering invalid a sole executive agreement pertaining to
international commerce when it conflicted with a prior federal statute.
The characterization as a sole executive agreement is improper. Admittedly, the Pelly and Packwood-Magnuson Amendments do not authorize
agreements which compromise their sanctions.2 60 Similarly, the legislation which implements the ICRW, 1 provided neither the Secretary of
Commerce nor the Secretary of State with the authority to compromise
IWC regulations in bilateral agreements. Other statutes, however, do
grant the secretaries the power to make agreements."6 " Specifically,
United States law empowers the secretaries to make fishing allocations
within the EEZ and grants the Secretary of State the authority to negotiate international fishing agreements. 6 Fishing allocations within the
United States EEZ played an integral part in the executive agreement
with Japan. In addition, the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) 2" charged the secretaries with the job of negotiating with
other nations to bring about marine mammal conservation. 2 5 The agreement, therefore, may be a congressional-executive agreement because its
topic fits within the parameters of congressional authorization.
The dissent's depiction of the conflict included review of the parameters of congressional authorization. The dissent found that the executive
branch's application of the law contradicted the legislative intent.2 66 The
applicable statutes send conflicting messages, however, and fail to set
clear boundaries for agreement-making authority. 6 7 Furthermore, con-

258. See id. at 2872.
259. See id. at 2875-76.
260. See 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1982); 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1982).
261. Whaling Convention Act of 1949, ch. 653, § 4, 64 Stat. 422 (1950) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 916b (1982)).
262. See, e.g., The Whale Conservation and Protection Study Act, Pub. L. No. 94532, § 4, 90 Stat. 2492 (1976) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 917(c) (1982)) (directed the Secretaries to negotiate bilateral whale conservation agreements with Mexico
and Canada).

263. 16 U.S.C. § 1821(c) (1982).
264. Marine Mammal Protection Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361-1407 (1982)).
265. See 16 U.S.C. § 1378(a) (1982); see also Legal Protectionfor Marine Mammals, supra note 11, at 30.
266. See 106 S. Ct. at 2874-76 (Marshall, J. dissenting).
267. See supra notes 62-70, 260-65 and accompanying text.
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gressional resolutions and debates send confusing signals. Congress has
asserted its support for enforcement of IWC actions, but has called on
the executive to negotiate compliance.2 68 Resolutions after the 1984
agreement with Japan demonstrate congressional support for the IWC
2 69
moratorium, but do not directly call for rescission of the agreement.
Finally, Congress and President Reagan do agree that whale conservation is the goal.2 70 They disagree, nonetheless, on the means to effectuate
conservation efforts.
The dissent made a crucial characterization by portraying the conflict
as a matter of international commerce. Marshall did so by finding that
the trade regulation and fishing allocation sanctions involved commerce.
The dissent's characterization makes sense when the conflict is depicted
as a question of choosing the sanctions to effect whale conservation policy. Yet the heart of the plaintiffs' contention is not that the sanctions
were improper, but that the sanctions were not imposed. Thus, the
plaintiffs are challenging the propriety of the conduct of United States
whale conservation policy. Trade burdens, therefore, are only the consequences of United States policy. Such broadside attacks on policy are
usually screened by the political question doctrine. 1 Had the issue been
characterized as one of foreign relations, therefore, the case probably
would have been dismissed as nonjusticiable.
While courts are reluctant to infer congressional authorization, they
strain to find concordant practice among the branches 272 Given the numerous conflicting signals sent by Congress, courts could easily identify
evidence of accord. For example, the executive commonly uses sanctions
to coax compliance with some policy objective. Sanctions provide a bargaining chip in negotiations. Therefore, Congress should have expected
such bargaining. Given congressional expectations and the judicial preference for finding accord, perhaps the majority's result was not improper
even without an express analysis of the viability of the executive
agreement.

268. H.R. Con. Res. 69, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1984); 130 CONG. REc. E4441 (daily
ed. Oct. 10, 1984) (statement of Rep. Waxman). See supra note 92.
269. H.R. Con. Res. 54, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. Con. Res. 23, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); 131 CONG. REC. E453 (daily ed. Feb. 7, 1985) (statement of
Rep. Bonker introducing H.R. Con. Res. 54).
270. See President's Message, supra note 86, at 727-28; HearingsII, supra note 81,
at 3.
271. See, e.g., Ramirez de Arellano, 745 F.2d at 1513-14; Dickson v. Ford, 521
F.2d 234, 236 (5th Cir. 1975). See also supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
272. L. HENKIN, supra note 165. See, e.g., Dames & Moore, 453 U.S. 654 (1981);
Miranda, 766 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1985).
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Had Congress authorized the agreement with Japan or expressly
granted the Secretary authority to bargain Pelly and PackwoodMagnuson Amendment certification, this dispute would not exist. Because the dissent concluded that the Secretary had acted outside of his
statutory authority, it should have addressed the viability of executive
agreements. The majority, on the other hand, had no need to discuss that
issue because it found that the executive agreement was not in conflict
with prior federal law.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Japan Whaling Association temporarily settled the question of whether the United States would pursue
whale conservation with a hard line or moderate approach. The Court's
decision to affirm the moderate approach will affect United States conservation efforts as well as the IWC's efforts. Conservationists argue that
a strict approach to whale protection is the only effective alternative.
Current United States policy and law reject that view. Had a full Court
adopted a strict conservationist position with Justice Marshall and the
other three dissenters, United States whale policy would be markedly
different. United States policy would be certain and predictable. But,
academic certainty and predictability may not protect whales.
This hard line conservationist approach would present whaling nations with the alternative of whaling or continuing to fish in the United
States EEZ. To Japan, this would pose a dilemma given the extent of
Japanese fishing in the United States EEZ. 17 Yet the Japanese may
find it more profitable to continue whaling because they could substitute
lost fishing opportunities in other countries' EEZs.17 ' The Soviets would
not face a similar dilemma because they presently have no fishing allocation in the United States EEZ. The decision may also be easy for other
whaling nations who may be able to fish elsewhere. United States law is
set to cancel all foreign fishing in the United States EEZ.27 5 If that happens, Packwood-Magnuson Amendment sanctions would be meaningless.
Moreover, mandatory sanctions leave United States negotiators in a
tenuous bargaining position because they lose all discretion and flexibility. Absent bargaining power, the United States will not have the means
to persuade whaling nations to discontinue whaling or even to conserve
whales.
273.
of fish.
274.
275.

See P. BIRNIE, supra note 1, at 627. The Japanese stand to lose 100,000 tons
Id.
See Note, Enforcement Questions, supra note 4, at 139.
Id. at 140.
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The moderate conservation approach adopted by the Court, nonetheless, may offer a more effective solution. With discretionary certification,
United States diplomats can use the threat of sanctions to negotiate compliance. Because international schemes function better on cooperation
than on coercion, the executive's interpretation of certification may be
best for whale conservation.
Although the court's result provides the benefits of a moderate approach to whale conservation, its legal reasoning is flawed. The Court
had the opportunity to dismiss the case for lack of a justiciable issue
simply by acknowledging that the dispute involved complicated foreign
policy matters. Instead of characterizing the case as a nonjusticiable foreign policy dispute, the Court analyzed it as a matter of statutory interpretation. Even if the case involved a statutory interpretation question,
the Court should have cited the Baker prudential considerations and dismissed the dispute. Instead, the Court rejected the political question arguments without analyzing the four prudential factors.
Had the Court dismissed the case for lack of a justiciable issue, the
result would have been more reasonable. It would have left the agreement with Japan intact without giving the executive free rein to pursue
or not pursue whale conservation. Furthermore, removing mandatory
sanctions weakens the United States' position as a consistent leader in
whale conservation. Finally, by avoiding a thorough political question
analysis and ignoring the prudential considerations in particular, the
Court gives the judiciary a vote in foreign policy.

Scott T. Larson

